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COMMENTARY ON "THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORSHIP
IN COMPARATIVE COPYRIGHT LAW":
A BRIEF ILLUSTRATION
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall*
In her inspiring Niro Distinguished Lecture, Professor Jane Gins-
burg advocates a reformulation of copyright law that is more author-
centered. She claims that such an approach would be more true to
copyright's goal of "stimulating the efforts and imaginations of private
creative actors" and cautions that "[b]ecause copyright arises out of
the act of creating a work, authors have moral claims that neither cor-
porate intermediaries nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly)
assert."' Further, in attempting to stimulate discussion of "who is an
author in copyright law," 2 Professor Ginsburg posits Six Principles
based on her extensive knowledge of the copyright landscape both
here and abroad. I find her multi-faceted approach to be an ex-
tremely useful way of contemplating the authorship issue, an issue
that I agree has been largely overlooked in both the copyright juris-
prudence and literature in the United States and elsewhere.3 Today,
more than ever, the "macroscopic" aspects of copyright law are com-
manding center stage in the legal, political and social arenas. 4 Profes-
sor Ginsburg's article is a welcome reminder that, despite all of the
attention copyright law receives in connection with issues involving
high technology, some fundamentally important basics such as the
characteristics of authorship still warrant extensive attention.5
In her article, Professor Ginsburg refers to David Nimmer's tour de
force analysis of authorship 6 written to explicate, and critique, the
* Raymond P. Niro Professor of Intellectual Property Law. DePaul University College of
Law: Director. DePaul University College of Law Center for Intellectual Property Law & Infor-
mation Technology (CIPLITTM).
1. Jane Ginsburg. The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law. 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1063. 1068 (2003).
2. Id. at 1066.
3. Id.
4. Russ VerSteeg. Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 123
(2002).
5. Id. at 183 ("Intent. originality, creativity, joint authorship and the relationships among them
are foundational building blocks that call for careful examination.").
6. Ginsburg, supra note 1. at 1085.
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Dead Sea Scrolls case recently decided by the Israeli Supreme Court.7
Nimmer endorses the "intent to be an author" standard (Principle 5),
a standard Ginsburg criticizes on the ground that "as a principle of
authorship decoupled from ownership . .. [it] obscures more than it
enlightens."8 Professor Ginsburg's observation is significant in that
she evidences an appropriate sensitivity to the critical distinction be-
tween authorship and ownership, and the consequences each entail.
The sole focus of copyright ownership is economic; in contrast, au-
thorship contemplates not only the receipt of compensation but also
the ability to exercise important non-economic (moral) rights such as
the right to prevent the mutilation of the work, and the right to com-
mand attribution.9 Although the distinction between the economic
rights exercisable by copyright owners and the moral rights enjoyed
solely by authors often is blurred, the Dead Sea Scrolls litigation is an
important reminder of a salient point: the answer to the question of
"who constitutes an author" may depend upon the context in which
the question is being raised.
In order to elaborate more fully on this issue, it is necessary to pro-
vide a brief background about the facts of this fascinating case, which
involved the defendants' unauthorized publication in the United
States of the deciphered reconstructed text of a particular Dead Sea
Scroll. 10 Harvard professor John Strugnell was among those scholars
who were initially allowed access to the scrolls pursuant to a policy of
exclusivity promulgated first by Jordan and subsequently by the An-
tiquities Authority of Israel. At first, Strugnell worked alone, but
eventually he required the assistance of someone with greater knowl-
edge of linguistics and Jewish law. Professor Elisha Qimron joined
Strugnell in 1981 and spent eleven years deciphering the scroll. From
the 60 to 70 fragments Qimron received from Strugnell, Qimron com-
piled a text of about 120 lines, referred to in the court's opinion as
"the deciphered text."'1 I In 1990, Qimron and Strugnell reached an
agreement with the English Oxford Press regarding publication of the
deciphered text, along with photographs of the scroll's fragments and
interpretation.1 2 Prior to the appearance of this publication, however,
7. Oimron v. Shanks, Unofficial Translation of Case, Aug. 30, 2000 (Michael Birnhack trans..
2000) (on file with author).
8. Ginsburg. supra note 1. at 1088.
9. Id. at 1068. n.16, 1092.
10. For a more detailed recitation of the facts, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution
Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77
WASH. L. REV. 985, 991-94 (2002).
11. Id. at 992.
12. Id.
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defendant Hershel Shanks published in the United States a book
called Facsimile Edition of the Dead Sea Scrolls. This book contained
the 120-line deciphered reconstructed text of the scroll and a set of
nearly 1800 photos of unpublished scroll fragments.' 3 Shanks gave the
credit for the reconstruction and decipherment to Professor Strugnell,
working "with a colleague." The unnamed colleague was Professor
Qimron, who at the time was a junior untenured academic.' 4
Professor Qimron filed suit in an Israeli court, alleging both copy-
right infringement and violation of his moral right of attribution based
on the defendants' failure to attribute partial authorship of the recon-
structed text to Qimron. The trial court ruled in his favor on both
counts, and this verdict was upheld by the Israeli Supreme Court.
Qimron's complaint raises two fascinating intellectual property issues:
first, whether Qimron has a copyright in the deciphered text; and sec-
ond, whether the defendants violated Qimron's right of attribution by
publishing the text without mentioning his name.' 5
Resolution of the copyright issue in this litigation was dependent on
whether Qimron's reconstruction of the Dead Sea Scroll was consid-
ered a sufficiently original work of authorship to merit copyright pro-
tection. In addressing the copyright infringement issue, the court
concluded that the phases of Qimron's work must be viewed in the
aggregate., rather than in isolation. The court referenced several
phases of creation, which included matching the scroll fragments
based on their physical compatibility; arranging the fragments in their
appropriate places; and filling in necessary gaps between fragments.
Upon such an examination of the work as a whole, the court con-
cluded that it revealed originality and creativity, so that "the addi-
tional soul" Qimron poured into the fragments converted them into a
living text capable of copyright protection.1 6 Thus, because the de-
fendants engaged in an unauthorized publication of the scroll, they
committed copyright infringement under Israeli law.17 In contrast, the
defendants argued that Qimron act of supplementing the text was sim-
ply a reconstruction of an existing work, and therefore the text was
not protected by copyright law. 18 Nimmer and other members of the
academy 19 have adopted this view, thereby severely criticizing the Is-
raeli courts' opinions in this litigation. Commentators have pointed
13. Id.
14. Id. at 991.
15. Id. at 992-93.
16. Kwall, supra note 10. at 993.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 995 n.61.
19. See VerSteeg. supra note 4. at 130.
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out that if all Professor Qimron did in reconstructing the text was to
decipher and track with precision a pre-existing document, he should
not enjoy copyright protection for his final product, because that work
would not constitute an original work of authorship. The only origi-
nality would be in mistakes.20
Under the multi-faceted approach to authorship endorsed by Pro-
fessor Ginsburg, Qimron's authorship claim would likely be validated.
She posits that in all of the jurisdictions under examination, there ap-
pears to be agreement that "an author is a human being who exercises
subjective judgment in composing the work and who controls its exe-
cution. ' 21 By all accounts, the enormity of the task of deciphering the
scroll required a high degree of intellectual conceptualization and di-
rection, absent undue reliance on mechanical assistance (Principles 1
and 2). Insofar as the requirement of "originality" is concerned (Prin-
ciple 3), Professor Ginsburg notes that in the United States, Feist Pub-
lications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.22 embodies the
operative legal standard. Under Feist, the standard for originality, re-
quiring independent creation plus a modicum of creativity, is quite
modest despite Feist's interpretation of this standard as constitution-
ally mandated. Indeed, Qimron's actions in crafting the reconstructed
text seem analogous to producing a translation, and copyright law his-
torically has extended protection to translations. 23 Just as a translator
must exercise judgment about word choices in the translation process,
so did Qimron make certain judgments regarding the reconstructed
fragments.
In his comprehensive analysis of the litigation, Nimmer notes nu-
merous examples of the types of judgments Qimron made in his re-
construction of the scroll. 24 Although Nimmer ultimately concludes
that none of Qimron's specific choices supports a conclusion of origi-
nality, and hence, copyrightability, of the reconstruction,25 I believe
the reconstruction process might be construed otherwise. For exam-
ple, Qimron made judgments regarding the length of the sentences in
20. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 995 n.61. for a more complete discussion of this point.
21. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1066.
22. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23. See, e.g., Merkos L'inyonei Chinuch. Inc. v. Ostar Sifrei Lubavitch. Inc., 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24139 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2002): Grove Press. Inc. v. Greenleaf Publ'g Co.. 247 F. Supp.
518, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
24. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Atthorship and Originality, 38 Hous.
L. REV. 5, 118-32 (2001).
25. In this regard, David Nimmer is not alone. See, e.g.. Niva Elkin-Koren. Of Scientific
Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38 Hosts. L. REV. 445
(2001) (contending that Qimron's reconstruction should not be copyrightable): see also supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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parts of the scroll, resulting in a decision to assemble the fragments
widthwise rather than lengthwise. 26 Additionally, based on research,
he selected a missing letter for a particular word in the text, resulting
in one particular interpretation of the text over a different interpreta-
tion. 27 Qimron and Stugnell, in fact, disagreed over these decisions, 28
thus further supporting Qimron's exercise of "choice as to the con-
tents and presentation of his work. ' 29 Although Feist clearly con-
demns all "sweat of the brow" works as uncopyrightable, the
operative question is whether Qimron did more than sweat in recon-
structing the fragments of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Clearly Qimron's en-
deavor was far more intellectually, emotionally and spiritually driven
than one undertaken by someone who alphabetizes listings in a tele-
phone directory. 30 Based on the various descriptions of what
Quimron actually did, it seems as though he should be able to com-
mand some type of authorship recognition for his work on the ground
that, as a human creator, he exercised "minimal personal autonomy"
in fashioning his work, "notwithstanding the constraints of [his]
task." 31 Professor Ginsburg's authorship analysis suggests a way in
which we might begin to contemplate the authorship construct that
would indeed allow this type of flexibility.
Equally significant under Professor Ginsburg's formulation is the
idea that an author should enjoy not only economic compensation, but
also the ability to "exert some artistic control" over her work. 32 The
Dead Sea Scrolls litigation raises the issue whether the right of attri-
bution should attach to works whose originality is debatable on some
levels. The Israeli court did not have to face this issue directly, in light
of its holding that the reconstructed scroll was subject to copyright
protection under Israeli law. Because under Israeli law, as elsewhere,
moral rights attach to copyrightable works,33 it was not remarkable for
the court to dispose of the copyright issue in the affirmative, and then
conclude that Shanks's failure to mention Qimron's name constituted
a violation of Qimron's moral right of attribution. A far more inter-
esting question, however, would have arisen had the court concluded
26. Nimmer. supra note 24. at 118.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 118. 122.
29. Ginsburg, supra note 1. at 1077.
30. Kwall. supra note 10. at 1031 n.259.
31. Ginsburg. supra note 1. at 1092.
32. Id.
33. Kwall. supra note 10. at 994.
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that there was nothing copyrightable about Qimron's work product. 34
Might the court still have concluded that, even absent originality in
the typical sense, a right of attribution nonetheless should attach?
Certainly such a scenario seems plausible in light of Professor Gins-
burg's Principle 4 ("the author need not be creative, so long as she
perspires"). Indeed, an exploration of this issue requires an examina-
tion of the essence of an individual's moral claim to her work
products.
Indeed, the more I contemplate the issues with which Professor
Ginsburg grapples in her Article, the more I am inclined toward the
view that part of deconstructing the nature of authorship, and recon-
figuring the relevant legal protections for works that are deemed to
possess "authorship," lies in further exploration of the psychological
and spiritual dimensions of the creative process.3 5 Authorship should
recognize that creative works are indeed the "children of creative spir-
its" and that many creators make an enormous psychological invest-
ment in these children, just as parents of offspring do.36 In my view,
Professor Ginsburg's analysis appropriately points toward the conclu-
sion that copyright law probably needs to recognize these interests
much more explicitly than it currently does.
34. I have argued elsewhere that in the United States, a judicial ruling in favor of Qimron on
the copyright issue would not have insured Qimron's right of attribution given the lack of ex-
plicit protection for this interest in this country. See Kwall. supra note 10, at 995.
35. Some non-legal works have explored these relationships. For an insightful analysis of the
relationship between gift exchange theory and artistic creativity, see LEwis HYDE. THE GiFr:
IMAGINATION AND THE EROTiC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983).
36. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall. "Author-Stories ": Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights
and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 61-62 (2001). For a further
discussion of the "paternity" metaphor. see Mark Rose. Copyright and its Metaphors,. 50 UCLA
L. REV. 11 (2002).
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